Practitioner/Policy Implications: In order to reduce discrimination before reaching the board we propose to implement education and mentoring initiatives to improve the training of the female candidates, to improve the work-and family-life balance. Once they are included in the pool of candidates the implementation of good corporate governance practices related to transparency and objectivity in selection procedures and/or even the establishment of a women's quota on boards may contribute to dismiss employers' negative beliefs about the capabilities of female candidates.
Spanish companies, where we have found a percentage of women that ranges from 6.6% to 8.6%.When seeking to identify possible causes of female underrepresentation, we opt to study determinants on the demand rather than the supply side.
Supply-side determinants relate to the tendency of women to participate less in the labour market and to their relative lack of long-term career commitment when compared with men, mainly as a consequence of motherhood, child care and the unequal allocation of household tasks. In looking for these kinds of causes, survey data, such as that of Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2009) are a useful reference. However, survey data are likely to be biased by the self-selection of those women who wish to 'showcase' their successful careers 1 . Besides, once a woman has reached the top executive rank, it is reasonable to assume that such supply-side differences are minimised and that such men and women are likely to be similar, sharing a high level of job motivation and lofty career ambitions (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001) . Hence, additional causes on the demand side should be explored.
The study of gender discrimination on the boards of directors of Spanish companies is important for a variety of reasons. Firstly, in today's corporate world, gender diversity has become a relevant topic at a time when a number of market regulators are considering quotas for women on publicly traded companies' boards as a requirement in their Codes of Conduct, and when improving governance is a key issue for firms to survive in a global crisis. In Spain this is a hot issue since the government, for Effective Equality between Women and Men), has undertaken to raise female representation on publicly traded companies' boards to 40 per cent by 2015, although this female quota is not mandatory but merely a recommendation. Secondly, the study of women's representation on boards is especially interesting as an extreme case in the broad research of possible causes of discrimination against women in the labour market.
In fact, many studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2004; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005) have addressed the differences in gender and race compositions The Spanish case offers a suitable setting for distinguishing among different causes of discrimination. In the Spanish business environment, women's economic integration remains a cause for concern given the marked lack of women in the higher decision-making positions (de Anca, 2008) . While data from the quarterly survey of the labour market conducted by the Spanish national statistics office show that women's participation in the Spanish labour market has steadily increased from 28% in 1976 to Table 1 for previous reports on women's presence on Spanish boards of directors). This proportion is one of the lowest among developed countries. In fact, Terjesen and Singh (2008) shows that Spain has the 8 th lowest percentage of women on boards among 43 countries studied, ahead only of Japan, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, Ireland, Austria and Argentina.
[ Insert table 1 about here] Nevertheless, the disadvantageous economic position of women in Spain does not equate to that exhibited in other social realms. In this respect, the WEF report shows that Spain ranks 9 th regarding political empowerment (6 th for women in ministerial positions with 44% female representation, and 11 th in women in parliament with 36% of female members), and in terms of education it occupies first position for level of enrolment in secondary and tertiary education (96% and 76% of all women R e v i e w C o p y 4 respectively). Therefore, there may be something in the economic area of Spanish society explaining this disparity.
Several theories explain this under-representation of women in the corporate world, based on adverse selection (women's incentive problems in the labour market)
leading to self-fulfilling prophecies about their professional development. Moreover, De la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens (2008) find evidence that discrimination against women plays a key role in the Spanish labour market when explaining differences across gender, despite the fact that men and women are ex-ante identical. Given that outcome, we focus our study on the possible presence of a 'glass ceiling' 2 (Morrison, White, & Van Velsor, 1987; Powell & Butterfield, 1994) as a crucial factor behind the scant presence of women on Spanish corporate boards.
We contribute to the literature on gender discrimination on Boards of Directors in several respects. Firstly, when looking for signals of discrimination on Spanish boards of directors we try to disentangle the mechanisms through which this might be taking place resorting to alternative theoretical models. In this sense, we take a step forward from similar studies by going into a level of detail which, to the best of our knowledge, no other study has achieved. Secondly, we control for a wider range of explanatory variables than the extant literature, which concentrates almost exclusively on visually observable firm characteristics. In this sense, we include variables that add features of the firm's industrial sector, such as industry competition (the HerfindahlHirschmann Index) and the proportion of female directors in an industry, along with a variable to control for the exogenous shock caused by the introduction in 2007 of the 'Equality Law'. And finally, unlike previous studies which mainly focus on Spanish listed companies or on a small sample of the largest Spanish companies, we focus on the top 1000 Spanish companies using similar criteria to those of the countries that usually monitor diversity on boards as an indicator of good corporate governance. The result of this is a database of unparalleled size and extensive scope in Spain (Catalyst gathers large scale data on women on boards in its Annual Census of the Fortune 500, but from US firms) that comprises more than 6000 board members in 2005 and around 5300 in 2008, with information collected from different sources (the SABI database, the files from the Mercantile Registry, e-Informa database, companies' annual reports and websites). This comprehensive database has allowed us to expand the number and the types of companies compared with previous studies and to estimate, through discrete outcome models, the probability of a directorship being held by a woman.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical models of discrimination and develop our hypothesis drawing on these theories. We then describe the data and the methodology of sample selection, and define the independent variables used. In the following section, discrete outcome models (negative binomial regression models) are used to estimate the probability of a director being a woman along with two additional models to gain further evidence for Becker's predictions and the contagion effect. Finally, we discuss the results obtained and present the main limitations and future research lines.
THEORETICAL MODELS OF DISCRIMINATIONAND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In corporate governance, the concept of diversity relates to board composition and refers to the mix of attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by individual board members in relation to board procedures and decision-making ( Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003) . In the widest sense, the various types of diversity in the boardroom include gender, age, ethnicity, race, nationality, culture, religion, constituency representation, independence, professional background, knowledge, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, and career and life experience (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Point & Singh, 2003; Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008) . In this paper we focus on the first of these.
Progress towards more diversified boards in terms of gender has been slow and efforts to diversify boards away from homogeneous, closed and elitist cultures have encountered many difficulties. Many explanations may lie behind the low representation of women on boards of directors. In the first place, there may be a limited proportion of women with the professional profile desired by the company to join the board and therefore, they are generally excluded from the pool of potential executive candidates to hold these positions. Generally, candidates to the board of directors are required to have, among other prerequisites, a high level of previous experience in positions of responsibility in departments such as production and finance, whereas the heads of departments in other areas, like human resources or marketing, where there is a greater presence of women, are not considered to the same degree as potential candidates to hold directorships.
The second explanation is discrimination due to preferences. In this sense, the company may discard female candidates for its board of directors even when they are R e v i e w C o p y 6 available because the decision-makers prefer forfeiting income rather than hiring women (Becker, 1957) . The third explanation for the scarce presence of women on boards is due to the fact that the abilities of women candidates are not correctly assessed. This includes statistical discrimination defined by Phelps (1972) that occurs when women are judged according to the average characteristics of their group and not on the basis of their own personal characteristics; and also the closely related mistakebased discrimination with respect to the systematic underestimation of women's skills (Wolfers, 2006) .
The reduced pool of female candidates limits their presence on the board.
Regarding the first group of explanations, which we call 'reduced pool of female executive candidates', the limited presence of women on boards of directors would not be due so much to gender discrimination in the selection process as to the existence of socio-cultural obstacles in the early stages leading up to the professional promotion of women. Nevertheless, even in a context without discrimination, it is an empirical (and unresolved) question whether this is efficient or not. In fact, some authors (Rodríguez Mora, 2009 ) argue that, even if there were no discrimination, an outcome where female participation is scarce would be inefficient insofar as the preferences and outlook on life that women have are a consequence of 'nurture' (they are brought up in certain ways)
and not 'nature', that is, because of their inherent condition of being women.
Among the factors that explain why there are fewer women than men with the potential to be appointed to boards of directors, there are some explanations, such as the existence of occupational segregation (Dolado, Felgueroso, & Jimeno, 2004) , which reduce the proportion of women in finance-related or more technical positions, which are precisely those functions more likely to be represented on a corporate board.
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) eligibility, a proportion higher than the actual 6-8% should be expected for women's presence on boards. Therefore, the significant gap between these figures points to the possibility of some kind of discrimination against women.
We label the first group of discrimination drivers as 'discrimination for preferences'. According to Becker's theory of discrimination (Becker, 1957) (Phelps, 1972) , the company that seeks to maximise its expected profit will discriminate against women if it believes them to be less qualified on average than men, or if the cost of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive. Thus, the company will look for easily observable variables (i.e. gender), instead of personal characteristics, which may reflect biased inferences on the part of the company and have nothing to do with productivity or information. Although there may be some economic rationality to this, inefficiencies can also be involved, as the a priori preference for male over female candidates might not only stem from the employer's previous statistical experience with the two groups, but also from the prevailing sociological beliefs concerning the abilities of women and from prejudices about them in society.
Closely related to this is mistake-based discrimination. Biased knowledge about female candidates has its roots in stereotyped profiles of men and women that have no real and objective basis. Therefore, if the low representation of women on the board were caused by this type of discrimination, the companies involved would be inefficient in their resource allocation, entailing a clear cost for them. We, therefore conclude that, given an underestimation of women's skills, in those cases where board nomination committees have some additional information about candidates, women's presence is substantially higher. This information prevents women from being assessed in terms of some kind of average of a female group or stereotype.
If there are stereotypes and social prejudices that bias the perception of women's abilities, this bias tends to disappear if more women are already on the board, since direct contact with people of the discriminated group, and the information provided by this, can offset the effects of social stereotypes and prejudices (Bertrand, Dolly, & Mullainathan, 2005) . According to this contagion factor, we are more likely to observe the addition of a woman to the board the higher the previous existing representation of women on the board. One example of this underestimation of women's skills that can be easily tested is to look at risk-aversion. The perception that women are more risk-averse than men (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998 ) is considered by some authors as a stereotype and as a major cause of the 'glass ceiling' on corporate promotion ladders (Johnson & Powell, 1994) . In this sense, Schubert, Brown, Grysler, and Brachinger (1999) found that, in contextual financial decisions, the preconceptions concerning the risk attitudes of female investors and managers may be more prejudice than fact, and they would be a source of statistical discrimination against women in financial and labour markets. The lower presence of women on the boards of firms engaged in riskier business can also be seen as a sign of statistical discrimination in the sense that, if women are expected to be more conservative investors than men, they are consequently excluded from those positions more concerned with risk-taking. This discrimination means that when a company faces a significant level of risk, it is less likely to hire women for the board, since they are wrongly seen as less skilled to make the risky decisions that may be necessary for a firm's success. To test whether riskaversion is a true stereotype, we expect the level of risk only to affect the hiring of new female directors in those companies with no woman on the board. By contrast, once women are on the board and their risk propensity can be correctly assessed by the whole board, there should be no effect of the level of risk on the gender of new board members.
Hypothesis 3.2. The risk level of the firm has no effect on the gender of new directors when there are already women on the board.
To sum up, Table 2 presents and summarizes all of the propositions and the hypotheses of our study and their relationship with the various theories of discrimination [Insert Table 2 about here]
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Data Selection
In Spain, the board of directors is the chief governing body of a company, and it is appointed by the shareholders' meeting. The company's bylaws specify the composition and number of members of the board and how they are to be chosen. However, article With reference to this gender diversity, the Code recommends that companies with a limited presence of women on their Boards should make a deliberate effort to find potential female candidates whenever a vacancy has to be filled (especially that of independent directors). In particular, the Nomination Committee must ensure that in the process of selecting new board members: a) there are no implicit biases preventing or impeding the selection of women; and b) companies will have to look intentionally for and include among potential candidates women with the professional profile sought.
The Code also specifies more specialized procedures for the selection of new board members. Although the CNMV considers there have been significant improvements in corporate governance at listed Spanish companies, it also underlines the need to have better board transparency, in particular in the selection processes.
The present study focuses on Spanish companies whose operating revenues exceeded 100 million euros in the year 2003, according to the SABI 3 database. This includes both listed and unlisted companies. We have chosen to analyse the largest companies because they mark a clear business and social reference. Small and mediumsized enterprises behave quite differently in terms of their corporate governance (Zahra, 10% of the total Spanish workforce. They also accounted for 65% of the companies with more than 5,000 employees, 40% of those with more than 1,000 and 30% of those with more than 500. Their aggregate operating revenue was equivalent to 65% of GDP and accounted for 78% of the returns of Spanish companies.
Information on the board members of companies was also obtained from the In some cases, it was necessary to supplement that data with information obtained from files from the Mercantile Registry, e-Informa database, and companies' annual reports and websites.
In order to determine the gender composition of the boards, we examine the first names of the board members. Spanish first names clearly identify gender, even for those names with the same root they have a different suffix (i.e. Antonio for male, Antonia for female). And in the case of composite names, the order signals the gender (i.e. María-José for female and José-María for male). Therefore, the gender of almost all directors was clearly signalled by their first names. For those remaining (mainly foreign -e.g. Japanese, Korean, French and Scandinavian -names), the matter was clarified one-byone using internet search: by the use of gender-specific language in a biography given in the Annual Report (Mr, Ms, he, she, his, her, etc); by a photograph given in the Annual Report; by internet materials (mainly news articles and the websites of foreign companies). Institutional board seats held by other corporations are excluded, since they are represented by a changing group of individuals whose identities and gender are unknown. Thus, to measure the number of female board members, only individual direct members were counted. There were only 633 institutionally held board positions Therefore, the exclusion of these seats from this study has a relatively small impact on the proportion of women on the boards of directors of these companies -63 companies With regard to the characteristics of the boards of directors ( We use these data to analyze hypothesis 3 in the following section.
Defining Independent Variables
We identify various firm characteristics as independent variables in our models since previous research documents relationships between the representation of women on corporate boards and specific firm characteristics (Farrell & Hersch, 2005) . We use measures of board size, firm size, degree of independence with regard to shareholders, firm age, profitability, productivity by employee, firm risk, indebtedness ratio, public contracts, competition in the industry and its proportion of female directors.
Additionally, we include the following variables: the cooperative association form of the company; if the firm is stock market-listed; its family-based character; and industry control dummies. Descriptive statistics concerning these variables are shown in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 about here] The availability of financial variables (profitability, productivity, risk and indebtedness, as well as firm size) depends on the existence of a firm's financial statements, which in some cases (unlisted companies) are available to the public only with considerable delay. Therefore we lag these variables a minimum of two years to ensure we have data for all the firms in the sample. This lag has the added advantage of reducing the risk of possible endogeneity between these variables and female representation (Carter D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Garay & González, 2008) .
In this way, we speak about causality in Granger's sense in such a way that financial variables produce the distinct proportion of women on boards of directors, and not vice versa. Additionally, firm effects and year dummies will help to reduce any bias on omitted variables (Carter D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010) .
Board size is measured by the number of individual direct members on the board. We have also included the square of this variable to take into account possible non-linearities. There are multiple ways of defining firm size. The most common quantitative criteria to measure it are: number of employees, total assets and net income (Osteryoung & Newman, 1993) . We choose total assets, since this measure is an established way of accounting for differences in firm size and has been used in previous R e v i e w C o p y 15 board-related studies (Agrawal & Knowber, 2001; Carter et al., 2003) . In order to avoid unusual results in one year distorting the measure, we calculate a two-year lagged threeyear mean.
Shareholder control in the company is measured by the Bureau van Dijk's Independence Indicator, which construct an indicator through its Database of Ownership to measure the degree of independence of the company in relation to its shareholders. The indicator is constructed as follows: the A indicator denotes the maximum degree of independence and is assigned when there are no shareholders registered with direct or complete ownership equal to or higher than 25% of the capital.
It is also divided into A+, A or A-based on the criteria that the higher the number of shareholders, the more difficult the control of a company. The B indicator is applied to companies in which none of the registered shareholders possesses 50% or more (direct or total) of the company's equity; again, this is classified as B+, B or B-depending on the identified number of shareholders. The C indicator is applied to a company with a registered shareholder who has more than 49.99% (direct or total), and also if a source indicates that there is a final ownership. Lastly, the indicator U shows an unknown degree of independence. We categorize this variable using values from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates the lowest grade of independence (C) and 6 the highest (A+).
Another variable used to characterize different attitudes toward the presence of women on boards of directors is the firm's age. To the best of our knowledge, while the relationship between time and discrimination is straightforwardly determined from the studies of Becker (1957) and Heckman (1998) , no other paper has empirically analyzed this linkage. The firm's age is introduced into the model in logarithms because the main differences are expected in the early years of the company.
We select two ratios to measure firm performance: profitability, measured using the two-year lagged mean of the return on assets (ROA) over three consecutive years, computed as net income divided by total assets; and the three-year mean of productivity per employee, calculated as the ratio of operating revenues (in thousands of euros) per employee lagged two years.
We also include a measure of leverage: the first is the three-year average of the firm's indebtedness ratio lagged two years, computed as the long-term debts of the company divided by the share capital plus reserves. Furthermore, we study the level of risk, as the volatility of profitability, measured by the standard deviation of the annual ROA computed over a two-year lagged 13-year period. We include three dummy variables in the models: family-based firm, listed company (quoted on a stock market) and cooperative association form since among the companies studied, the representation of women on the governing bodies of cooperative companies is greater than in any other type of company (i.e., public limited companies and limited liability companies). In the case of the family-based firm variable, we use the dimensions of ownership and power as a classification criterion (Gersik, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Thus, a company is considered a family-based firm when various members (at least two) of the same family hold seats on the board of directors and/or a significant portion of the shares of the company are owned by the same family.
6 When a company is a subsidiary or is part of a family group, but no member of the family is on its board of directors, this company is not classified as a family-based firm since the family is not directly involved in its management. To verify the family nature of the companies in the sample analysed, we have the help of the Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (Family Business Institute), which checked our list against its Finally, in order to take into account possible differences between industries, we combine the companies into industry classifications used by the Spanish Stock Markets (Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME)), and we include industry fixed effects based on these classifications 7 . In table 5 we show a correlation matrix for all the variables used in this section.
[Insert Table 5 In this negative binomial model, parameter α allows us to quantify the grade of over-dispersion of variable y i (the greater α is, the greater the variance will be with respect to the mean). In this way, if α = 0, the negative binomial becomes a Poisson distribution (equal mean and variance). However, if 0 ≠ α , then there is a so-called Table 8 .
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Robust estimations of the negative binomial regression models are presented in Table 6 9 . The number of direct members of the board is used as the exposure factor ( i n )
in the negative binomial regression models. This implies that, although the independent variable is the number of direct members, the outcome of the regression, and the effects of the independent variables can be interpreted in terms of the expected proportion of 
RESULTS
Regarding the interpretation of the significant explanatory variables in the models, we include four groups of variables: the control variables and the variables concerning Beginning with the control variables, the number of direct members of the board is used as the exposure factor in the negative binomial regression models, but is added, terms, so an increase in board size only has an effect for small boards, since the effect on the proportion of female directors reaches a maximum when the board has around 20 to 25 members (see Figure 1 ).
As prior research suggests (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007; Fryxell & Lerner, 1989; Harrigan, 1981) Additionally, we find a (marginally significant) negative relationship between the presence of women on the board of directors and the fact of being a listed company (see Table 6 ), and the firm size variable. By contrast, Agrawal and Knowber (2001) found for the US a positive sign that they attribute to a greater demand for diversity directed at these companies through public opinion. Usually, these types of companies (large and listed) include a smaller proportion of proprietary directors on their boards while having a higher proportion of executives and independent directors, where women are under-represented.
Other control variables related to profitability (ROA) and productivity (turnover The results (see Table 6 ) confirm hypothesis 1.2. Family-based companies, where board members are chosen mainly among owners and where the pool of candidates stems from family ties and not from executive positions, has a positive relationship with the proportion of women directors. In fact, Family-based firm is the variable that has the greatest positive impact on the presence of women on boards of directors (see Table 6 ).
A reduced pool of female candidates is far from being the only explanation of the differences between companies in the observed number of female directors. As we have previously commented, theoretical arguments focused on the characteristics of the female labour supply (which we called the reduced pool of female executive candidates) cannot explain, on their own, the sizable gap found in women's participation in Spanish boards of directors. Therefore, when we interpret the sign and effect of the explanatory According to Becker's taste-based discrimination, as discriminating companies incur higher economic costs, in perfect competitive markets they tend to disappear.
Hypothesis 2.1 states that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of women on the board and industry competition. The results in Table 7 and Figure 1 show that the level of industry concentration, measured by the HHI index, has a negative effect on the proportion of female directors. Since this index decreases with industry competition, the sign of the estimated coefficient is congruent with hypothesis 2.1 and also in line with the dynamics predicted by Becker's theory, that discrimination is less likely in competitive sectors.
As can be seen in the models of table 6 and figure 1, the age of the firm has a positive relationship with the proportion of women on the board (Hypothesis 2.2). This also reinforces the idea behind Becker's model of taste-based discrimination. The fact that older companies have more women on their boards seems to indicate precisely that companies that survive are those that integrate more diversity into their boards. By contrast, among younger ones it is easier to find both discriminating companies and those who do not discriminate 10 .
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Hypothesis 3.1 states that the presence of women on the board helps to reduce statistical discrimination and other mistake-based discrimination. The estimated negative binomial models show that there is a positive and significant contagion effect.
Likelihood ratio tests also confirm the existence of over-dispersion of the number of women on the boards of directors, since the negative binomial model is preferable to the simple Poisson regression model. By contrast, a likelihood ratio test against a zeroinflated negative binomial allows us to conclude that this later model is not better than the negative binomial model, and that the contagion factor is able to explain sufficiently the observed over-dispersion.
This significant contagion effect indicates that the presence of women on the board lessens barriers to other female candidates. That is to say, if there is a woman on the board, it is more likely that other women will be appointed to the same board. So far, there are at least three different causes for this contagion factor. The first two are hypothesised by Farrel and Hersch (2005) . One, on the supply side, is that potential female candidates may be more attracted to firms that have already achieved some and at the same time to count the number of female and male directors leaving and joining the company's board (see Table 3 ).
The model specified is also a negative binomial model ( Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The results in (2005) for Fortune 500 companies, implying that companies in their sample tend to add women to their boards when they have low or no female representation, operating in a manner consistent with tokenism. By contrast, we find no evidence that if a female director leaves the board that gives rise to the probability of another female joining it, as would be expected if diversity were a goal of the firm.
Regarding Hypothesis 3.2, in the static negative binomial models of Table 6 , the risk, measured as the standard deviation of the ROA, helps to explain the different proportion of women directors. Given the sign of the estimated coefficient we can affirm that companies with greater uncertainty in their results are those in which it is less likely to have a woman as a director (see Table 7 ). This result is consistent with statistical discrimination in the sense proposed by Schubert et al. (1999) . In this respect, if women are expected to be more conservative investors than men, they will be consequently excluded from those positions more related to risks. Nevertheless, this outcome is compatible with genuine higher female risk-aversion (Bernasek, 1998; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998) .
Once again, we can rely on the dynamic negative binomial model approach to disentangle the two alternative explanations. In order to do this, we include in the model the risk variable moderated by the presence of women on the board as stated in Hypothesis 3.2 (we estimate two different coefficients for the risk variable, one for companies with women on the board and another for those without women). In the last model on Table 8 , which includes this moderating term, we observe that the risk variable is significant when there are no women on the board, but not statistically significant when the company already includes women on the board. So, when there are women on the board, the risk level of the company has no effect on the gender of new directors, while for those companies without women, higher risk on income reduces the probability of hiring additional women. This result is in line with the statistical discrimination interpretation of Schubert et al. (1999) , rather than with the actual risk aversion by female executives.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have disentangled the relative importance of the main factors explaining the scarce presence of women on the boards of directors of the top 1000 as the preferences and outlook on life that women have may be a consequence of the way they are brought up (and usually both firms and head-hunters specialized in board nominations that tend to explain the underrepresentation of women use this argument to explain it), the later ones indicates a problem of efficiency in the nomination process.
This inefficiency is not just because having women necessarily have to improve business results in a direct and measurable way, but because the decision to exclude women of the process of recruiting new directors for the mere fact of being women is clearly inefficient (reduces the probability of choosing the best possible candidates for the company independently of their gender).
In fact, the results of our model estimations indicate a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of female executives in the industry and the percentage of women on the board. This result supports the reduced pool of women candidates from executive positions as a cause for the under-representation of women on the Spanish boards of directors. This is also confirmed by the positive relationship between family-based companies and the proportion of women directors. We think this effect is caused by the tendency to favour family ties, regardless of gender, when it comes to promoting directors. In this way, as in family-based firms female executive candidates to the board are chosen among the owners-managers women family members the restriction of a reduced pool of women in the executive management does not apply.
One of the important practical implications of these results is that if we want to raise the proportion of female directors it seems necessary to look for mechanisms to reduce the exclusion of women from the pool of potential candidates to join the board.
On one hand, the reduced proportion of female candidates can only be resolved in the medium to long term with education and mentoring initiatives to improve their training for boards and management responsibility. Mentorship of young female managers by veteran CEO's (Lee and Nolan, 1998) could help potential future directors to built self confidence, develop particular skills, learn about industry and increase personal impact.
Another way to mitigate the socio-cultural obstacles women find in the early stages leading up to their professional promotion is the implementation of polices to achieve work/life balance and to share home duties more equally between men and women. A Nevertheless, in order to focus on customized measures that better improve the chances of a female executive reaching the board, it would be worth analyzing how her personal (social, familiar, economic) characteristics affect her professional development, including her subjective perception of positive/negative gender discrimination measures.
Although the reduced pool of women candidates is a major cause, we find it quite improbable that the large gap existing between the scarce female representation on Spanish boards of directors and the approximately 32% of women's participation in top executive positions can only be attributed only to differences in the labour supply. In fact, results related to the rest of the hypotheses we analyze in the paper confirms that the reduced pool of candidates is not the only argument.
In this sense, there is evidence of taste-based discrimination. Moreover, we interpret the fact that older firms and more competitive sectors have a greater presence of female directors as a manifestation of the prediction from Becker's theory of discrimination (Becker, 1957) . In this respect, we can point out that both competition and time seem to be playing in favour of women's presence on Spanish boards. Another relevant consequence of this finding is that the relationship of women directors and firm performance (that is out of the purpose of this paper) cannot be properly measured without controlling for this two factors that affect both the gender composition of the board and the results of the company and to the best of our knowledge no study has yet done it.
Further research on this issue could give more evidence on the presence of discriminating practices. For instance, knowing the gender composition of a company's management could help ascertain whether there is some discrimination bias in the nomination process by comparing this group with the actual board members. Event Although data on failed candidates are difficult, if not impossible, to find, one exception is the case of Mergers and Acquisitions where the board of the resulting company is generally chosen from among the boards of the original companies and, therefore, we also know the names of the former directors that are excluded of the new board.
Through the estimation of a negative binomial model, we also detect a contagion factor, according to which the presence of women on the board smoothes the way for other women joining the board. The results of the empirical model that analyses the likelihood of adding a female to the board strongly confirm that this is a true contagion rather than a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity in the sample ('spurious contagion').
We interpret this contagious effect as evidence of the possible existence of a certain underestimation of women's skills, based on the fact that the presence of women on the board contributes to reducing the bias in the perception of their abilities, since direct contact with people of the group discriminated against could reduce the effects of stereotypes and social prejudices (Bertrand, Dolly, & Mullainathan, 2005) .
Additional evidence of incorrect preconceptions about women attitudes and their capacity to hold these positions is found through a moderator effect of the presence of women on the risk variable. In this sense, although the lesser presence of women on the boards of riskier firms can be interpreted by using the explanation that women are usually more risk-averse than men (Bernasek, 1998; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998) , we find that this negative effect disappears in the presence of women directors. The absence of a significant parameter of the interaction of women directors and risk support the theory of Schubert et al., (1999) since the prejudices concerning the female attitudes to risk would be eliminated or, at least, reduced, as the actual presence of female directors provides information on their real attitudes to risk.
These evidences on inefficiencies in the nomination process does support public policy initiatives such as the implementation of those good corporate governance practices related to transparency and objectivity in selection procedures (i.e., Results on these models would be provided by a request to the authors. 9 In order to check the consistency of the significance of the coefficients, we have estimated each model twice: first including all the independent variables; and a second one eliminating one-by-one all the nonsignificant variables. In both cases we obtain the same significant variables, which can be considered as a robustness check for the significance of the coefficients against multicolinearity. Results on these models would be provided on request by the authors. 10 As a robust check of this later result and taking into account that 72 companies among our sample disappeared between 2005 and 2008, it is possible to estimate a probit/logit model on the probability of a company being closed down. Following Altman (1968), equity over debt, reserves over assets, working capital over assets, income over assets and return on assets are used as predictors of bankruptcy, as well as the number of women on the board, age of the company, industry dummies and other control variables. The result of this probit estimation reinforces our previous conclusions: younger companies and start-ups as well as a lower proportion of female directors have a higher proportion of default. For the flows of directors we used a sub-sample of 992 companies: from the original sample of 1148 nonfinancial companies, we have excluded those which were extinct in 2008 and those companies whose boards were entirely formed by institutional board members. Estimations obtained with STATA v.9. A robust variance-covariance matrix is used in order to correct heteroscedasticity and correlation among directors of the same board.
For each variable, an LR test has been performed between a model with and without this variable. Stars give the significant level of the null hypothesis rejection: 0.1% ***, 1% **, 5% * and 10% †. Probabilities computed for the models in Table 4 (models I and II). A representative company in 2008 has been considered to be a non-family-based one, that is not listed and not a cooperative, with an independence indicator equal to C, mean risk and assets, 24 years old, and belonging to the category of Consumer Services, with the mean proportion of female executives and sales concentration and with five direct members of the board (mean and mode of each quantitative and qualitative variable respectively). All variables are fixed to the base case and moving each variable one by one. Probabilities computed for the models in Table 4 (models I and II). A representative company in 2008 has been considered to be a non-family-based one, that is not listed and not a cooperative, with an independence indicator equal to C, mean risk and assets, 24 years old, and belonging to the category of Consumer Services, with the mean proportion of female executives and sales concentration and with five direct members of the board (mean and mode of each quantitative and qualitative variable respectively).
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